Abstract This study presents a theoretical framework for examining the effect of the Japanese government-regulated medical price schedule, 'Shinryo-Houshu-Seido,' on the behavior of medical providers. In particular, we discuss the optimal rule of this price schedule for the regulator, taking into account information asymmetry between the regulator and providers. Our simple model predicts that heterogeneous providers either under-provide or over-provide medical inputs in comparison with the socially optimal outcome. Moreover, our results show that when the allocated budget is reduced to a certain level, even the second-best outcome becomes unachievable, no matter how the price schedule is regulated. While the limited budget size is shown to have a clear negative effect on social welfare, we suggest that the prospect of obtaining the second-best outcome is left to negotiation between the regulator and the budget allocator.
providers by incorporating the budget constraint for the regulator into our framework. The study on the SHS and its effect would be important to understand the Japanese health care system as well as to provide some guidance, relating health care financing through public health insurance and its performance, to policy makers in developed and developing countries who attempt to establish or reform their health care system.
As most developed countries have been struggling to reduce the ever increasing medical expenditure, Japan has also been trying to re-direct its national medical expenditure. Several drastic reforms of the public health insurance scheme have been implemented by the Japanese government over time in order to control the national medical expenditure, amongst which the revision of the SHS is one. The government has incrementally been changing prices or fees of medical inputs, treatments and events covered by the public health insurance subject to the SHS. 1 Thus, all medical fees or retail prices are fully regulated by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW). Campbell (1999, 2004) argue that government intervention through the SHS has been remarkably effective in controlling the increasing level of medical expenditure, thus suggesting the important role played by the regulatory policy of the SHS in the Japanese health care scheme. 2 Since price revisions are considered to induce changes in medical expenditure, it is plausible to assume that medical providers respond to changes in the governmentregulated prices of medical inputs that they provide to their patients. Consequently, any retail price regulation of the SHS by the MHLW can be considered as being strategic with the aim to control the volume of medical inputs used by medical providers. 3 Hence, we develop a theoretical framework to characterize the behavior of medical providers under such a fully regulated system.
When we develop a theoretical framework for the SHS, we should incorporate the Japan specific aspect of the supply side of medical services. As stressed by McGuire (1985) , it is common in the literature to consider the internal structure of a hospital such as the interaction between medical providers and hospital managers. However, we simply assume that the hospital manager coincides with the medical provider, so that we ignore such interaction between the two agents. This is because a large portion of medical doctors are self-employed or very close to self-employed in Japan, and we could treat many medical providers as hospital managers. Furthermore, there is a strong argument in Japan that under the current SHS scheme the profit maximizing behavior of such self-employed medical providers results in the increasing medical expenditure. Indeed, the policy change in the regulated prices by the MHLW under the SHS induces the change in the volume of medical inputs immediately.
We discuss the optimal choice of medical inputs by providers which differ in not only price, but also effectiveness. Two types of medical inputs are considered: one is cheaper but less effective than the other. Upon the optimal response by medical providers to the regulated prices, we also evaluate the regulatory policy based on social welfare. In general, whether or not the regulator can achieve the first-best outcome depends on the availability of information to the regulator. In the case of the SHS in Japan, it is important for the regulator to obtain information about how providers respond to changes in regulated fees, which obviously depends on the benevolence of providers. However, since it is extremely difficult to observe the extent to which providers are interested in the welfare of their patients, any decision regarding changes in medical prices by the regulator will have to be made based on asymmetric information. The incorporation of asymmetric information on benevolence between the regulator and providers into our framework enables us to explore the second-best outcome of the SHS.
In addition to information asymmetry, we also incorporate another constraint to the regulator when trying to maximize social welfare, namely budget constraint. The budget allocated to the MHLW is usually pre-determined by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and it is taken as given when the MHLW regulates the SHS. In other words, the MHLW has to change regulated prices in order to fulfil its budget constraint by taking into account the optimal response of providers under information asymmetry. The MHLW as the regulator may fail to achieve the second-best solution under the limited budget constraint with asymmetric information, which is indeed a condition that occurs commonly in all ministries as a result of limited budgets being pre-determined by the MOF.
We briefly present our results as follows. Firstly, the extent to which the under-provision or over-provision (from the perspective of the social optimality) by heterogenous providers occurs depends on the price schedule and their degrees of the benevolence under asymmetric information. When a new medical input is more profitable, providers tend to involve the overprovision of a new and profitable medical input. On the other hand, when an old medical input is more profitable, less benevolent providers tend to involve the under-provision of a new and less profitable medical input due to their strong profit-incentive, while highly benevolent providers tend to involve the over-provision of a new and effective medical input due to the significant effectiveness of a new medical input. We may interpret the relationship between a new medical input and its previous counterpart, for example, as that between a generic drug and its equivalent branded with a better known label, where our current model makes a prediction that is consistent with the empirical result found by Iizuka (2007) that financial incentives among medical providers matter in the Japanese prescription drug market.
Secondly, the analysis incorporating the regulator's decision of the price schedule suggests that without its budget constraint, the regulator achieves the second-best outcome by regulating prices of medical inputs under information asymmetry. The second-best solution highly depends on the distribution of providers' degrees of the benevolence. In particular, the second-best solution suggests that compared to the socially optimal outcome, the regulator's optimal choice of the price schedule tends to encourage less benevolent providers to involve the under-provision of a new medical input and highly benevolent providers to involve the over-provision of a new medical input. Finally, our model shows that when the allocated budget to the regulator is below a certain level, even the second-best outcome becomes unachievable. While the global cap or the limited budget size is shown to have a clear negative effect on social welfare, we suggest that the prospect of obtaining the second-best outcome without complete information on heterogenous providers is left to negotiation between the regulator and the budget allocator. In Japan, the MHLW acts as the regulator, and its budget is allocated by the MOF. Thus, as long as the MHLW can negotiate with the MOF about its budget size, the MHLW can at least achieve the second-best outcome.
We organize our paper as follows. The next section reviews the related literature briefly. Section 3 presents our basic framework. Section 4 describes the analysis of detailed models of medical providers as well as of the regulator, and then discusses their optimal decision rules and their outcomes in comparison to the socially optimal outcome. In this section, we highlight the effect of budget caps as well. Finally we conclude our paper in Sect. 5.
Related literature
Among many studies on physicians' behavior as well as the reimbursement schemes of the health care system, the argument on the choice of prescription by physicians are in particular related to our discussion. 4 Hellerstein (1998) , Coscelli (2000) , Lundin (2000) , and Liu et al. (2009) discuss the choice by physicians between generic drugs and its equivalent branded with a better known label, and also argue that physicians or hospitals may act as imperfect agents for their patients in the pharmaceutical market. 5 Recently, Liu and Ma (2012) discuss physicians' treatment plan and health insurance by developing the model of practice styles by physicians' heterogeneous preferences towards their patients, where physicians are partially altruistic and their utility is weighted sums of profits and patients' utilities. 6 Iizuka (2007) empirically examines the expert-client relationship in the context of the Japanese prescription drug market, and argues that the existence of markup distorts prescription decisions by physicians who often both prescribe and dispense drugs. 7 While the existing literature explores the expert-client relationships such as the relationship between providers and patients, we examine the regulator-expert relationship, or the interaction between the regulator and medical providers. In our model, the regulator explicitly takes into account the optimal response of medical providers when it optimally regulates the prices of medical inputs. Providers take the prices of inputs as given when they optimally choose their inputs. Providers are heterogenous in terms of their benevolence, and the regulator has no information on the benevolence of heterogenous providers when it optimally sets prices of medical inputs.
Another related literature is concerned with the effect of global budget caps. Poterba (1994) surveys the literature on global budget caps, and Van de Ven (1995) investigates the effect of the global budget in the regulated health care system. Mougeot and Naegelen (2005) studies the expenditure cap scheme in the European countries in comparison with the fee-for-service scheme by using the model in which hospitals choose the quality and the cost of medical inputs, and they discuss the effectiveness of the expenditure cap policy for the reduction of medical expenditure in the European countries. While the expenditure cap policy has been implemented in order to reduce national medical expenditure in the European countries, Japan directly regulates the retail prices of medical inputs instead. The MHLW 4 Many theoretical studies examine various issues related to payment systems such as prospective and costbased payment systems (Newhouse 1983 (Newhouse , 1996 Ellis and McGuire 1986 , 1988 , 1990 , 1993 Dranove 1987; Pope 1989; Selden 1990; Allen and Gertler 1991; Glazer and McGuire 1994; Rogerson 1994; Ma 1994; Ma and McGuire 1997; Chalkley and Malcomson 1998; Ellis 1998; Lewis and Sappington 1999; Bos and Fraja 2002; Beitia 2003; Boadway et al. 2004; Mougeot and Naegelen 2005; Siciliani 2006, and Wright 2007) . Several studies apply mechanism-design approaches to investigate the health care system with information asymmetry (Lewis and Sappington 1999 and Beitia 2003) . See also McGuire (2000) , and Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) for the literature review. 5 Grabowski and Vernon (1992) ; Jacobson et al. (2006), and O'Malley et al. (2006) discuss the relationship between the prices of medical inputs and the reimbursement schemes. Ii and Ohkusa (2002) examine the price sensitivity of demand for primary care services in Japan. 6 Our model contains several similar elements as that of Liu and Ma (2012) , such as altruistic physicians and consumers' illness severity. Their model considers the role of the delegation regime of health insurance, where an insurance company establishes a payment contract with the physician, and an insurance contract with the consumer. However, this system is totally different from the Japanese heath care system. In Japan, central government regulates the prices and the financing system. All citizens are covered by a mandatory employment-based health insurance operating on non-profit basis (see Anabacken (1994) ). 7 Iizuka (2007) also argues that physicians consider more financial burdens of their patients than their own profits. Iizuka (2009) investigates the behavior of pharmaceutical firms which produce generic drugs in the regulated Japanese pharmaceutical market. revises prices of all medical inputs covered by the public health insurance every other year in order to control the national medical expenditure. In other words, the MHLW changes all regulated prices of medical inputs in order to fulfill its budget cap or constraint. We investigate the effect of budget caps on the behavior of the regulator, the MHLW, when the regulator optimally sets medical prices to maximize social welfare.
The model
This study investigates the effect of the regulated price schedule on the behavior of medical providers, focusing on the relationship between the regulator and medical providers. 8 All aspects of the demand side are taken as given. Since we are mainly concerned with the current Japanese public health care system, the relationship between insurers and providers is also as given.
In the context of the Japanese public health care system, the MHLW fully regulates prices of medical inputs covered by the public health insurance subject to SHS within its budget being predetermined by the MOF as the budget allocator. This implies that the MHLW changes the regulated prices (fees) in order to satisfy its budget constraint determined by the MOF. Furthermore, the MHLW can ex post observe economic activities of each provider in the monetary term, and the names of medical items used and the volume of them are both observable. However, the reason why each provider used a particular medical item cannot be detected, and thus the degree of benevolence of each provider is not observable. We explicitly consider information asymmetry in terms of the benevolence of providers between the regulator and providers, and examine the current SHS of the Japanese health care system.
We consider a society with many patients who need to receive medical inputs (services) from providers. The number of patients is normalized at unity. There are two medical inputs available to providers, s ∈ {0, 1}: medical input 0 is an old type with a lower cost but it is less effective, while medical input 1 is a new type with a higher cost but it is more effective. 9 The cost of providing medical input s is c(s) for all providers, such that a new medical input is more costly, i.e., 0 < c(0) < c(1). The regulated price of medical input s is set by the regulator at p(s) in the SHS. Note that p(s) is the revenue when a provider chooses to provide its patient with medical input s. Given the co-payment rate τ ∈ (0, 1), the payments to a provider from its patient and the public health insurance are τ p(s) and (1 − τ ) p(s), respectively. 10 Each patient is heterogeneous in terms of the severity of her health status, λ > 0, which is distributed according to a distribution function F. A patient can visit only one provider and is treated with either old or new medical input. The payoff of patient λ who is treated with medical input s is given by the health-related payoff h(s, λ) minus her co-payment τ p(s):
To make our model tractable, the health-related payoff from medical input s for patient λ is given by h(s, λ) = θ − (1 − s)α λ, where α > 0 and θ > 0. This specification simplifies the effectiveness of a new medical input. A patient who receives a new medical input obtains the fixed health-related payoff of θ irrespective of the severity of her health status, while the health-related payoff of a patient who receives an old medical input is θ −α λ, which decreases with a rise in the severity of her health status. 11 The severity of the health status, λ, is unobservable for a patient but can be identified by a provider. As emphasized in McGuire (2000) , such asymmetric information allows providers to act as imperfect agents due to conflicts of interests. For simplicity, we assume that providers can choose the type of medical inputs, so that patients always accept all medical inputs suggested by their providers. The assumption that all patients act passively could be regarded as an extreme case of the physician-induced demand studied by Evans (1974) .
One crucial assumption is that there are two types of providers: less benevolent providers (LBs) and benevolent providers (HBs). Both LBs and HBs provide either medical input 0 or 1 by considering their own and patient's interests as imperfect agents for their patients. The payoff of the providers associated with the provision of medical input s to patient λ is described by the sum of their profits (or the markup), π(s) = p(s) − c(s), and their patient's payoff (or the benevolence):
where ρ ∈ {ρ L , ρ H } measures the intensity of the benevolent part of the payoff, depending on patients' health-related payoff h(s, λ) as well as their co-payments τ p(s). 12 The parameters, ρ L and ρ H , represent LB's and HB's intensities of the benevolence, respectively, with 0 < ρ L < ρ H < 1/τ . The assumption of ρ < 1/τ guarantees that a rise in the price of a medical input increases the payoff of providers with other parameters fixed. We further assume that the providers never provide a medical input whose price is less than its cost (i.e., π(s) ≥ 0), so that negative net revenues are not allowed. The fraction of LBs is r ∈ (0, 1). The type of providers is private information, and a patient visits her provider without any identification of its type. Thus, patients randomly visit either LBs or HBs, so that r and 1 − r are the shares of patients who visit LB and HB, respectively.
Social welfare is defined by the integral of the health-related payoffs for patients minus the cost incurred by the provision of medical inputs:
where s L (λ) ∈ {0, 1} and s H (λ) ∈ {0, 1} denote the treatment choice of a medical input to patient λ made by LBs and HBs, respectively. The first term is the social welfare associated with the patients treated by LBs, while the second term corresponds to that with the patients treated by HBs.
The regulator can set the price of medical input s, p(s), to maximize social welfare. 13 We assume that the regulator knows the ratio of each type of providers, but it cannot identify whether a provider is a LB or HB, so that typical adverse selection problems occur due to information asymmetry on the type of providers between the regulator and providers. Furthermore, we assume that the regulator cannot control its own budget size B as well as the co-payment rate τ , which are predetermined outside the model. In the Japanese context, the MHLW is regarded as the regulator. The assumption of the pre-determined budget available to the MHLW corresponds to the concept of a global budget cap, as analyzed in Poterba (1994) ; Van de Ven (1995) , and Mougeot and Naegelen (2005) .
To analyze how regulatory policies affect providers' treatment choice of medical inputs, we consider the following two stages: at the first stage, the regulator sets the prices of the two medical inputs, p(0) and p(1), by taking into account the optimal response of providers. At the second stage, providers decide which medical input is given to their patients, and the payoffs for providers are determined.
Analysis

Social optimality
The social optimality requires that for each patient the difference between the health-related payoff and the cost incurred by the provision of a medical input to the patient is maximized, i.e., U (s, λ) ≡ h(s, λ) − c(s) is maximized for all λ. The provision of an old medical input is optimal for λ if U (0, λ) > U (1, λ), and the provision of a new medical input is optimal if U (0, λ) < U (1, λ). Let κ ≡ c(1) − c(0) > 0 denote the cost-gap between an old and a new medical inputs. The social optimality requires that providers give patients λ < λ o an old medical input, and also give patients λ > λ o a new medical input, where
A patient with the low severity of her health status should be treated with an old and cheap medical input, while a patient with the high severity should be treated with a new and expensive medical input. However, in general a society does not have an effective mechanism to enforce providers to achieve the above defined first-best or socially optimal outcome.
Providers' decision problem
We now present the optimal treatment decision for providers at the second stage, and then compare the derived result with the socially optimal outcome. Given the price schedule (or the prices of medical inputs, p(0) and p (1) 
Note that the optimal treatment choice of providers depends on the difference in the margins (the relative price of a new medical input) but not on the price level of medical inputs. This implies the following preliminary result:
Lemma 1 Given the price schedule , the optimal treatment choice of medical inputs made by provider ρ ∈ {ρ L , ρ H } satisfies that provider ρ chooses an old medical input to patient λ < λ * ( , ρ) and a new medical input to patient λ > λ * ( , ρ). Moreover, λ * ( , ρ) is increasing in ρ if > 0, and it is decreasing in ρ if
Providers generally provide a new medical input to patients with the relatively high λ > λ * ( , ρ) and provide an old medical input to patients with the relatively low λ < λ * ( , ρ), since an old medical input is less effective for patients with more severe health status. Figure 1 (Fig. 2) corresponds to the case of > 0 ( < 0), where a new medical input is more (less) profitable for providers. It should be noted that when > 0, less benevolent providers with the relatively low ρ < ρ * ( ) ≡ τ ( +κ) pay more attention to their own profit and thus always prefer to provide a new medical input to any patient (see AB of the graph of λ * ( , ρ) in Fig. 1) . Moreover, when > 0, a rise in ρ implies the decline in the self-profit incentive, so that providers are more likely to provide a less profitable old medical input. This causes λ * ( , ρ) to increase with ρ (see BC of the graph of λ * ( , ρ) in Fig. 1 ). In contrast, when < 0, a rise in ρ encourages providers to use a less profitable new medical input through the decline in the self-profit incentive. This causes λ * ( , ρ) to decrease with ρ (see AC of the graph of λ * ( , ρ) in Fig. 2 ). We now discuss how the optimal treatment choice is affected by a change in the price schedule, particularly the difference in the margins. Differentiating λ * ( , ρ) with respect to yields λ * ( , ρ) = (τ − 1/ρ)/α < 0 if λ * ( , ρ) > 0 and λ * ( , ρ) = 0 otherwise. This result characterizes the relationship between the difference in the margins and the critical value of the severity of the health status:
Lemma 2 The optimal treatment choice of medical inputs made by provider
A rise in the difference in the margins, , has two sub-effects on the critical value λ * ( , ρ). The first sub-effect comes from provider's self-profit incentive, so that a rise in encourages providers to provide a new medical input to more patients. The second sub-effect originates from patient's payoff, so that a rise in increases the co-payment by patients and discourages providers to use a new medical input. The condition of ρ < 1/τ guarantees that the first subeffect dominates the second, i.e., λ * ( , ρ) decreases with a rise in . Thus, a rise in the difference in the margins encourages providers to use a new medical input for more patients. In Figs. 1 and 2 , the thick curves represent the graph of λ * ( , ρ), and the dotted curves represent the graph of λ * ( , ρ) when increases. To discuss the outcome of providers' treatment decision in comparison with the social optimality, we compare the critical value λ * ( , ρ) with the socially optimal level of the critical value, λ o . The simple calculation yields that: (1) In Figs. 1 and 2 , the thick graph represents the critical value differentiating the provider's optimal treatment choice, λ * ( , ρ), and the line at λ = λ o represents the socially optimal level of the critical value. Figures 1 and 2 show the cases of > 0 and < 0, respectively. If > 0, a new medical input is more profitable for providers, so that all providers are encouraged to use a new medical input in comparison with the socially optimal outcome (Fig. 1) . On the other hand, if < 0, an old medical input is more profitable for providers. In comparison with the socially optimal outcome, less benevolent providers are encouraged to use an old medical input due to their high profit-motivation, while highly benevolent providers are encouraged to use a new medical input due to its high effectiveness on the health status (Fig. 2) . Notice that for any < 0, the critical value ofρ( ), which differentiates between over-and under-provision of a new medical input, is decreasing in .
The regulator's decision problem
This subsection describes the regulator's decision at the first stage. The regulator determines prices of medical inputs by taking into account the optimal responses of two different types of providers, LBs and HBs. The regulator maximizes social welfare:
where
to welfare of all patients treated by LBs and HBs, respectively. The regulator reimburses providers for the provision of medical inputs through the SHS. The total amount of reimbursements is:
] denote the amount of reimbursements to LBs and HBs, respectively. Note that the welfare functions depend only on the difference in the margins (or the relative price of a new medical input to an old medical input), while the total amount of reimbursements depend on both the difference in the margins and the price level of medical inputs.
To understand the role of asymmetric information, we characterize the optimal decision of the regulator in two different environments. The first environment is that the regulator has complete information on the type of providers without any budget constraint. The second environment is that there is information asymmetry in terms of the type of providers between the regulator and providers. We also discuss the role of the predetermined budget constraint, B > 0. The latter case corresponds to the actual situation, where the MHLW has been changing prices in the SHS every other year in order to satisfy its budget predetermined by the MOF. In the rest of the paper, we assume that λ is uniformly distributed over (0, 1), and λ o = κ/α < 1, so that the social optimality requires that some patients are treated with a new medical input, and others are treated with an old medical input.
Complete information
The first environment enables the regulator to set the discriminated price schedules to each provider such that W L ( ) and W H ( ) are maximized respectively, without consideration of the budget constraint. Since the welfare functions depend on the difference in the margins (or the relative price of a new medical input), but not on the price levels of medical inputs, the regulator's choice variable is only the difference in the margins. In a later part of the case with asymmetric information, we take into account the budget constraint which determines both the difference in the margins and the price levels of medical inputs.
Let L and H denote the regulator's optimal choices of the difference in the margins for LBs and HBs, respectively, and let λL ≡ λ * ( L , ρ L ) and λH ≡ λ * ( H , ρ H ) denote the corresponding critical values differentiating the choice of medical input for LBs and HBs, respectively. The social optimality requires that λ
Then we can deduce the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the regulator has the information on the type of providers without its budget constraint. Then the regulator's optimal choice of the price schedule for provider
Moreover, the regulator's optimal choice achieves the socially optimal level, i.e., λi = λ o for i ∈ {L , H }.
The regulator's choice affects the providers' treatment behavior by changing the critical value of the degree of the severity of the health status. Lemma 2 has presented that as long as λ * ( , ρ i ) > 0 λ * ( , ρ i ) is decreasing in (see Figs. 1 and 2 ). The possibility of < 0 with the assumed property of ρ i < 1/τ guarantees that the regulator enables each provider's treatment choice to achieve the socially optimal level of the critical value λ o by setting the discriminated price schedule i . Notice that i < 0 so that the margin of a new medical input is smaller than that of an old medical input. This implies that providing an old medical input is more profitable for providers. The regulator sets the discriminated price schedules at H < L < 0 with λL = λH = λ o . In Fig. 3 , curve LF represents the graph of the critical value λ * ( L , ρ), and curve HF represents the graph of the critical value λ * ( H , ρ). These graphs intersect with the horizontal line λ = λ o at ρ = ρ L and ρ = ρ H (see points C and D).
Asymmetric information
In the second environment with asymmetric information, the regulator cannot differentiate the price schedule for each provider. The regulator has to seek the unique price schedule to maximize social welfare (2) subject to its budget constraintB ≥ B ( , p(0) ). In our model, the choice of the prices of the two medical inputs, p(0) and p(1), is equivalent to that of the difference in the margins (capturing the relative price of a new medical input), , and the price of an old medical input (capturing the price level of medical inputs), p(0). When the predetermined budgetB is large enough, the regulator's choice problem can be reduced to the two-step problem: the first is to set the difference in the margins, , to maximize social welfare (2) without consideration of the budget constraint, and the second is to adjust the price of an old medical input, p(0), to meet the budget constraintB = B ( , p(0) ). On the other hand, when the predetermined budgetB is not large enough, the regulator's problem cannot be reduced to the two-step problems, i.e., the regulator needs set the whole price schedule, consisting of and p(0), simultaneously subject to the budget constraint.
We first consider the regulator's choice problem without consideration of its budget constraint. We call this solution the second-best outcome. The regulator optimally proposes the unique difference in the margins to both LBs and HBs. In a later part, we will take into account the budget constraint. Given the assumption that λ is uniformly distributed over (0, 1), we simplify the first-order condition W ( ) = 0 into:
This condition requires the regulator to set the unique difference in the margins in order to equate the marginal welfare associated with W L ( ) with that associated with W H ( ). We manipulate (4) to obtain the regulator's optimal unique difference in the margins:
where 
Proposition 1 has shown that complete information enables the regulator to set the discriminated price schedules such that the absolute value of the difference in the margins for HBs is larger than that for LBs ( H < L < 0), and both LBs and HBs provide a new medical inputs at the socially optimal level (λ L = λH = λ o ). However, asymmetric information enforces the regulator to offer identical price scheduleˆ to all providers such that H <ˆ < L < 0. In comparison with the social optimal outcome, the lower relative price of a new medical input (ˆ < L ) encourages LBs to use an old medical input (λ o <λ L ), and the higher relative price of a new medical input (ˆ > H ) encourages HBs to use a new medical input (λ H < λ o ). In Fig. 3 , curves LF and HF represent the graphs of λ * ( L , ρ) and λ * ( H , ρ) , respectively, and curve MF represents the graph of λ * (ˆ , ρ). Curve MF is located between curves LF and HF, so that H <ˆ < L < 0 and ρ L <ρ(ˆ ) < ρ H . As shown in Lemma 3, LBs with the relatively low ρ L <ρ(ˆ ) under-provide a new medical input, while HBs with relatively high ρ H >ρ(ˆ ) over-provide a new medical input (see points X and Y in Fig. 3 ).
The role of budget constraint
This subsection characterizes the regulator's decision in the case that the regulator faces not only information asymmetry but also its budget constraint. Given the total budget available to the regulator,B, we impose the constraint ofB ≥ B ( , p(0) ), which can be written as:
is the price difference in the two medical input, and 1
is the total number of patients who are treated with a new medical input. The second term of the RHS is the total amount of reimbursements associated with the price gap between an old and a new medical inputs. In addition, the assumed property that providers never use a medical input whose price is less than its cost requires that π(s) ≥ 0 or p(s) ≥ c(s) for each s ∈ {0, 1}. Figure 4 illustrates possible combinations of the prices of old and new medical inputs in ( p(0), p(1))-space, taking the regulator's optimal difference in the margins,ˆ , under no budget constraint (the second-best solution) as given. Line AB represents the graph of
Any combination on line AB enables the regulator to attain the second-best solutionˆ , irrespective of positive or negative margin of each of Fig. 4 The role of budget constraint the two medical inputs. The assumption of non-negative margins, π(s) ≥ 0, requires that the plausible combination of ( p(0), p(1)) must be in the shaded region of Fig. 4 . The property ofˆ < 0 guarantees that line AB intersects with segment IE at point H. Thus, without any consideration of the budget constraint, the regulator can attain the second-best outcome by choosing any combination of ( p(0), p(1)) on segment BH.
The above discussion derives two important results related to the predetermined budget sizeB. First, the budget constraint ofB ≥ B(ˆ , p(0)) withˆ < 0 and π(s) ≥ 0 implies that if the budget size is large enough such thatB ≥ B(ˆ , c(0) −ˆ ), there exists a unique combination of the prices of old and new medical inputs,
The relatively large budget size allows the regulator to achieve the second-best solution by choosing an appropriate price schedule (p 0 ,p 1 ). In contrast, if the budget size is relatively small such thatB < B(ˆ , c(0) −ˆ ), then the regulator fails to achieve the second-best solution. Second, the minimum budget size achieving the second-best solution is described by B(ˆ , c(0) −ˆ ). In this case, the prices of old and new medical inputs can be described by p m 0 = c(0) −ˆ and p m 1 = c(1), respectively (see point H in Fig. 4 ). Providers can enjoy the positive margin of an old medical input, while they cannot get any profit by providing a new medical input.
In the context of the Japanese health care system, the MHLW, as a regulator, completely regulates all the prices of medical inputs covered by the public health insurance. The MHLW obviously has to limit its activities within its allocated budget, and it cannot ignore its limited budget constraint when it changes prices of medical inputs every other year. On the other hand, the size of the budget allocated to the MHLW is determined by the MOF, and the MOF might make the budget of the MHLW more tight in order to reduce the huge amount of government deficits. 14 In fact, the new political power tends to reduce the total amount of the government budget, and the resources available to the public health insurance tend to decrease. Thus, in practice, the situation, where the budget constraint is binding such that B < B(ˆ , c(0) −ˆ ), is likely to occur in the Japanese health care system. 15
Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical framework to explore the effect of SHS, the fully regulated price schedule of the Japanese health care system, on the behavior of medical providers and have discussed the optimal policy for the regulator under information asymmetry between the regulator and providers. We have also discussed the effect of budget caps by incorporating the budget constraint for the regulator into our framework. Our analysis has shown that providers' degrees of the benevolence (over her patients' health status and financial cost), which is a source to asymmetric information, play an important role in determining the performance of the health care system or whether each provider involves the over-or under-provision of a new medical input to her patients in comparison with the socially optimal outcome. 14 Ihori et al. (2011) evaluate the reforms of the Japanese public health insurance started in year 2006 in the dynamic general equilibrium framework with overlapping generations, where the effect of government deficits is explicitly considered. 15 To reduce the total amount of reimbursements, the regulator controls prices of medical inputs. This would also affect the pharmaceutical industry. Kurata (2009) points out the relationship between the existing SHS and firms' profitability and argues that high prices of brand-name drugs have induced strong incentives in the pharmaceutical industry to invest in the development of new and competitive drugs. However, our analysis has not incorporated the role of pharmaceutical firms and the relationship between medical providers and the pharmaceutical industry in Japan, which should be addressed in the future research.
It should be noticed that there are three sources to distort the first-best economy in our model: the impossibility for medical providers to set prices of medical inputs below their costs, information asymmetry between medical providers and the MHLW as the regulator, and the too-tight budget constraint for the MHLW imposed by the MOF. In reality, it seems difficult to present remedies for the first and second problems in the actual health care system. However, it would be easier to cope with the third problem related to the budget size of the MHLW. The MHLW might strategically be able to negotiate with the MOF to expand its budget size for achieving the second-best outcome. As long as the MHLW can expand its budget size, or the MOF simply allocates enough budget to the public health insurance system, the MHLW can at least achieve the second-best outcome by controling prices in the SHS, even if it cannot observe the benevolence of heterogenous providers. Given the opinions suggesting the urgent need of establishing or reforming the health care system in various countries, our analysis of the SHS of the Japanese health care system would provide some important guidance, relating health care financing through public health insurance with regulated price system, to the policy authority in both developed and developing countries.
